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If there is a well-known public key for authenticating site B via
digital signatures (e.g., [RSA78]), then one approach for B to
provide nonrepudiable acknowledgements to A is for B to pass a
digital signature to A as part of the click-through protocol. This
signature could sign a tuple containing the IP address of the user,
the time and date of the referral, the page to which the referral was
made, and the referring page. A can then retain this signed tuple
for use in a dispute with B later, if necessary. Like in
Section 4.1, B can create this signature
in serve.cgi and include it within pageB.html, to be
passed as an argument to a CGI script on site A by the user's
browser when pageB.html loads.
A drawback of this approach is that it requires B to compute a
digital signature per referral, which must be done on its critical
path for servicing the user's request. Because digital signatures,
particularly RSA signatures [RSA78], tend to be computationally
intensive, the additional computational load imposed by these
signatures may be prohibitive if B is a very busy server.
Next: Using hash chains
Up: Click-through nonrepudiation
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Mike Reiter
7/21/1998