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Format of Security Alerts
Network data collected to support threat analysis, fault diagnosis,
and intrusion report correlation may range from simple MIB statistics
to detailed activity reports produced by complex applications such as
intrusion or anomaly detection systems. So far, we have used the term
security alert loosely to refer to site-local activity produced
by a network security component (sensor) as it reports on observed
activity or upon an action it has taken in response to observed activity.
A security alert can represent a very diverse range of information,
depending on the type of the security device that produced it. In this
section, we consider the typical content of security alerts from the three
primary types of alert contributors used in the context of Internet-scale
threat analysis centers.
Table 1:
Summary of security alert content.
Source_IP |
FW,ID |
Typically refers to the source IP address of the machine that initiated
the session or transferred the transaction that caused the alert to fire.
In IDS alerts, this field may represent the victim, not the attacker,
since some systems alert upon an attack reply rather than request. |
Source_Port |
FW,ID |
Source TCP or UDP port of the machine that initiated the session or
transferred the transaction that caused the alert to fire. |
Dest_IP |
FW,ID,AV |
Typically refers to the destination IP address of the machine that
initiated the session or transferred the transaction that caused the
alert to fire. In AV systems, Dest_IP can identify the machine in
which the infection is discovered. |
Dest_Port |
FW,ID |
Destination TCP or UDP port of the machine that initiated the session
or transferred the transaction that caused the alert to fire. |
Protocol |
FW,ID |
Protocol type (e.g., UDP, TCP, ICMP). |
Timestamp |
FW,ID,AV |
May incorporate incident start time, end time, incident report time. |
Sensor_ID |
FW,ID,AV |
May incorporate the brand and model of the sensor and a unique identifier
for the individual instantiation of the sensor. |
Count |
FW,ID,AV |
Often used to represent some notion of repeated activity, either at the
alert or event (e.g., packet) level. |
Event_ID |
FW,ID,AV |
Uniquely defines the alert type for the given sensor. |
Outcome |
FW,ID,AV |
Reports the status or disposition of the reported activity. For
firewalls, it may report whether the log entry was associated with
an allow or deny rule. For AV, it may indicate infection disposition
(e.g., Symantec's AV indicates whether the infected file is cleaned or
quarantined). Outcome fields for IDS tools are highly vendor-specific. |
Captured_Data |
ID |
Some IDS sensors have the ability to report part or all of the data
content in which the alert was applied. |
Infected_File |
AV |
Antivirus logs include the identity of the file that was infected. |
|
Firewalls reside at the gateways of networks, and contribute
reports that indicate ``deny'' and ``allow'' actions for traffic across
the gateway boundary. Most typically, firewalls contribute alerts
flagging incoming packets that were denied. Volume, port, and source
distribution patterns of such packets provide significant insight into
the probe and exploit targets of malicious systems, new attack tools,
and self-propagating malicious applications.
Intrusion detection systems include network- and host-based
systems, and may employ misuse or anomaly detection. Unlike firewalls,
intrusion detection reports may represent a wide variety of event types,
and can report on anomalous phenomena that span arbitrarily long durations
of time or events.
Antivirus software reports email- and file-borne
virus detection on individual hosts. Reports include virus type,
infection target, and the response action, which is typically to clean
or quarantine the infection.
Table 1 summarizes the fields that constitute
a typical firewall (FW), intrusion detection (ID), or antivirus (AV)
security alert in its raw form, prior to data sanitization.
Next: Threat Model
Up: Privacy-Preserving Sharing and Correlation
Previous: SMC schemes
Vitaly Shmatikov
2004-05-18