|
Security '01 Abstract
StackGhost: Hardware Facilitated Stack Protection
Mike Frantzen, Cerias, and Mike Shuey, Engineering Computer Network
Abstract
Conventional security exploits have relied on overwriting the saved return pointer on the stack to hijack the path of execution. Under Sun Microsystem's Sparc processor architecture, we were able to implement a kernel modification to transparently and automatically guard applications' return pointers
Our implementation called StackGhost under OpenBSD 2.8 acts as a ghost in the machine. StackGhost advances exploit prevention in that it protects every application run on the system without their knowledge nor does it require their source or binary modification.
We will document several of the methods devised to preserve the sanctity of the system and will explore the performance ramifications of StackGhost.
- View the full text of this paper in
HTML,
PDF, and
PostScript.
The Proceedings are published as a collective work, © 2001 by the USENIX Association. All Rights Reserved. Rights
to individual papers remain with the author or the author's employer.
Permission is granted for the noncommercial reproduction of the complete
work for educational or research purposes. USENIX acknowledges all
trademarks within this paper.
- If you need the latest Adobe Acrobat Reader, you can download it from Adobe's site.
- To become a USENIX Member, please see our Membership Information.
|
Need help? Use our Contacts page.
