

YAF: Yet Another Flowmeter

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Yet Another Flowmeter

- Flowmeter
 - What is flow
 - Why do you want flow
 - So why YAF

flow

- The simple version: a very brief summarization of a network connection
- The key values
 - IP address source & destination
 - Protocol
 - Transport source & destination port


flow

- And the rest...
 - Time / Date etc.
- Lots of variations / possibilities here
 - Number of packets sent / received
 - Number of bytes sent / received

But I don't do billing?
(or even if you do)


Kaminsky DNS protocol vulnerability

- Cache poisoning via DNS transaction ID guessing
- Not enough randomness, makes guessing easy





Objectives in YAF's construction



- Compliant to standard for flow, IPFIX
- Biflow based construction
- High performance (based on profiling)
- Flexible L2 decoding
- Open design for adding enhancements




Condensed IPFIX Primer



Condensed IPFIX Primer



Network Capture Spectrum



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Network Capture Spectrum

Traditional Flow
(NetFlow v5)

Packet Features

Headers

Capture Type



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
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
Network Capture Spectrum

Packet Features



Network Capture Spectrum

Packet Features



Current YAF Capture (minimal privacy impact)

- Balancing Act Between Understanding Our Network and Privacy
 - Basic flow information:
 - Who talked to whom, how much, when
 - Application labeling:
 - Banner analysis for port independent protocol checking

Current YAF capture (minimal privacy impact)

- Application labeling (continued)
 - can recognize:
 - HTTP, SSH, SMTP, Gnutella, Yahoo Messenger, DNS, FTP, SSL/TLS, SLP, IMAP, IRC, RTSP, SIP, RSYNC, PPTP, NNTP, TFTP, Teredo, MySQL, POP3

Current YAF capture (minimal privacy impact)

- Entropy analysis
 - Good indication if traffic is encrypted or compressed

Current YAF Capture


- DNS capture
 - Because it is the root of almost all valid network transactions
 - We can limit capture to just Authoritative and NXDomain responses
 - Or capture all DNS transaction information

Current YAF Capture

- Highly detailed capture for specific protocols:
 - HTTP
 - Server, User-Agent, GET, Connection
 - HTTP, Referer, Location, Host
 - Content-Length, Age, Content-Type
 - Accept, Accept-Language, (Result Code)

Current YAF Capture

- Other in depth protocols
 - FTP, IMAP, RTSP, SIP, SMTP, SSH
- Soon to be added
 - X.509 Certificates
 - Primarily from recognized SSL/TLS protocol negotiations



Capturing Flow (and others) using IPFIX

- Using the IPFIX model, we can turn on many features in YAF, and filter with mediators
- We can enhance our handling of specific data types, still carry the information in IPFIX, and send to future places

Finishing the Full Deployment

- We have some of the backend tools to handle the various different data types from YAF now. (Storage and analysis)
- Working on the simple/dumb backend (probably MySQL based) to just capture data (may not scale well enough)
- IPFIX mediator toolkit materials are available

Objectives Met?

- YAF is deployed in LARGE scale environments now
- We have been able to quickly add both network encapsulation types and specific network traffic data decoders quickly
- IPFIX has proven to be both compact and flexible

Where do you fit in?

- It is available for you to use
- You can enhance and extend it - we are willing to take contributions
- Adding certain new detectors (especially for text based protocols) is *really* easy
- You tell me

Getting YAF

<http://tools.netsa.cert.org>

netsa-help@cert.org



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Questions? Comments?

Gratuitous plug:



Salt Lake City Marriott Downtown
Salt Lake City, Utah
January 10-13, 2011

Backups




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