2006 USENIX Annual Technical Conference Abstract
Pp. 267–272 of the Proceedings
Stealth Probing: Efficient Data-Plane Security for IP Routing
Ioannis Avramopoulos and Jennifer Rexford, Princeton University
Abstract
IP routing is notoriously vulnerable to accidental misconfiguration
and malicious attack. Although secure routing protocols are an
important defense, the data plane must be part of any complete
solution. Existing proposals for secure (link-level) forwarding are
heavy-weight, requiring cryptographic operations at each hop in a
path. Instead, we propose a light-weight data-plane
mechanism (called stealth probing) that monitors the
availability of paths in a secure fashion, while enabling the
management plane to home in on the location of adversaries by
combining the results of probes from different vantage points (called
Byzantine tomography). We illustrate how stealth probing and
Byzantine tomography can be applied in today's routing architecture,
without requiring support from end hosts or internal routers.
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