 
The Initial Intrusions (Phase 1)
  -  Initial root compromise points of origin
       
	 -  "No charge" ISPs
	      
		-  Single PPP account "guest", password "password"
		
-  No AUP, no user records, no Caller-ID, no trap/trace
	      
 
-  Compromised systems in Korea, Germany, Sweden, Jamaica, UK, etc.
	 
-  Compromised name servers, web servers, home systems,
              software development companies, "day trading" companies,
              e-commerce sites, ISPs, NASA, .mil sites... you name it
	 
-  Using wingate and telnet gateways to bounce off
              foreign sites
	 
-  Stolen dialup accounts
       
 
-  24x7 scanning, sifting into sets
       of single architecture/service/vulnerability combination
  
-  Attacks then come in waves, hitting many
       systems in a very short time period:exploit,
       install backdoor, install tools, lather, rinse, repeat
  
-  Anatomy of setting up a DDoS network
  
-  Often using "Root Kits" to conceal programs/files/connections
The Distributed DoS Attacks (Phase 2)
  -  Victim network(s) become unresponsive, routers fail,
       normal diagnostic tools useless
    
      -  Identification of all agents difficult
      
-  Most sites not prepared to analyze packets (e.g. w/tcpdump)
      
-  May look like hardware failure on the network backbone
      
-  Must coordinate with upstream providers immediately
           (upstream networks may/may not be saturated also)
      
-  Upstream providers in better position to gather forensic
           evidence (but may also be under pressure to restore service
           first)
    
 
-  Attack may/may not be noticed on agent networks (e.g., single
       subnet saturated, but backbone "normal")
  
-  Only takes several hundred systems (especially if Internet 2
       sites) to knock a large network off the Internet
  
-  Multiple attacking systems at multiple sites means a long
       time to neutralize network and fully stop attack
       (especially on weekends and where international language
       bariers exist)
  
-  Third party effects felt elsewhere (e.g., TCP
       SYN|ACK and RST|ACK packets to spoofed networks)
[Next]
|
[Prev]
|
[Top]
Dave Dittrich <dittrich@cac.washington.edu>
Last modified: Sat Jul 22 02:43:12 PDT 2000