NSDI '08 – Abstract
Pp. 1–14 of the Proceedings
One Hop Reputations for Peer to Peer File Sharing Workloads
Michael Piatek, Tomas Isdal, Arvind Krishnamurthy, and Thomas Anderson, University of Washington
Abstract
An emerging paradigm in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks is to explicitly
consider incentives as part of the protocol design in order to
promote good (or discourage bad) behavior. However, effective
incentives are hampered by the challenges of a P2P environment,
e.g. transient users and no central authority. In this paper, we
quantify these challenges, reporting the results of a month-long measurement of
millions of users of the BitTorrent file sharing system. Surprisingly, given BitTorrent's popularity, we identify widespread performance and availability problems. These
measurements motivate the design and implementation of a new, one hop
reputation protocol for P2P networks. Unlike digital currency systems,
where contribution information is globally visible, or tit-for-tat,
where no propagation occurs, one hop reputations limit propagation to
at most one intermediary. Through trace-driven analysis and measurements of a deployment
on PlanetLab, we find that limited propagation improves performance and incentives relative
to BitTorrent.
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