12th USENIX Security Symposium Abstract
Pp. 59-74 of the Proceedings
Analyzing Integrity Protection in the SELinux Example Policy
Trent Jaeger, Reiner Sailer, and Xiaolan Zhang, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Abstract
In this paper, we present an approach for analyzing the integrity
protection in the SELinux example policy. The SELinux example policy
is intended as an example from which administrators customize to
create a policy for their site's security goals, but the complexity of
the model and size of the policy make this quite complex. Our aim is
to provide an access control model to express site security goals and
resolve them against the SELinux policy. Ultimately, we aim to define
a minimal trusted computing base (TCB) that satisfies Clark-Wilson
integrity, by first testing for the more restrictive Biba integrity
policy and resolving conflicts using Clark-Wilson semantics. Our
policy analysis tool, Gokyo, implements the following approach: (1) it
represents the SELinux example policy and our integrity goals; (2) it
identifies conflicts between them; (3) it estimates the resolutions to
these conflicts; and (4) provides information for deciding upon a
resolution. Using Gokyo, we derive a proposal for a minimal TCB for
SELinux includes 30 subject types, and we identify the work remaining
to ensure that TCB is integrity-protected. Our analysis is performed
on the SELinux example policy for Linux 2.4.19.
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