12th USENIX Security Symposium Abstract
Pp. 1-14 of the Proceedings
Remote Timing Attacks Are Practical
David Brumley and Dan Boneh, Stanford University
Abstract
Timing attacks are usually used to attack weak computing devices such
as smartcards. We show that timing attacks apply to general software
systems. Specifically, we devise a timing attack against OpenSSL.
Our experiments show that we can extract private keys from an
OpenSSL-based web server running on a machine in the local network. Our
results demonstrate that timing attacks against network servers are
practical and therefore security systems should defend against
them.
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