NSDI '08 – Abstract
Pp. 175–188 of the Proceedings
Nysiad: Practical Protocol Transformation to Tolerate Byzantine Failures
Chi Ho and Robbert van Renesse, Cornell University; Mark Bickford, ATC-NY; Danny Dolev, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Abstract
The paper presents and
evaluates Nysiad,
a system that implements a new technique for transforming a scalable
distributed system or network protocol tolerant only of crash failures into
one that tolerates arbitrary failures, including such
failures as freeloading and malicious attacks.
The technique assigns to each host a certain number
of guard hosts, optionally chosen from the available collection
of hosts, and assumes that no more than a configurable number of
guards of a host are faulty.
Nysiad then enforces that a host either follows the system's protocol
and handles all its inputs fairly, or ceases to produce
output messages altogether--a behavior that the system tolerates.
We have applied Nysiad to a link-based routing protocol and an overlay
multicast protocol, and present measurements of running the resulting
protocols on a simulated network.
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