# FATE and DESTINI A Framework for Cloud Recovery Testing



Haryadi S. Gunawi, Pallavi Joshi, Peter Alvaro, Joseph M. Hellerstein, and Koushik Sen





Thanh Do, Andrea C. Arpaci-Dusseau, and Remzi H. Arpaci-Dusseau



Dhruba Borthakur

### Cloud and failure recovery

#### Cloud

- Thousands of commodity machines
- "Rare (HW) failures become frequent" [Hamilton]

#### ☐ Failure recovery

- "... has to come from the software" [Dean]
- "... must be a first-class op" [Ramakrishnan et al.]
- But ... hard to get right

#### Cloud reliability Whoops Cloudy tos with a chance of When ose Sidekic<sup>\*</sup> failure Web star With what shar More in literatur Data loss, who system fown in Google Chubb [Burrows06] - 91 recovery issues found in HDS over 4 years

### Why?

- □ Testing is not advanced enough
  - Cloud systems face complex multiple, diverse failures
- □ Recovery is under-specified
  - Lots of custom recovery
  - Implementation is complex
- □ Need two advancements:
  - Exercise complex failure modes
  - Write recovery specifications and test the implementation


### Cloud testing

### **FATE**

Failure Testing Service

### **DESTINI**

Declarative Testing Specifications



#### Contributions

#### FATE

- Exercise multiple, diverse failures
  - Over 40,000 unique combinations (80 hours)
  - Challenge: combinatorial explosion of multiple failures
- Pruning strategies for failure exploration
  - An order of magnitude speedup
  - Found the same #bugs

#### DESTINI


- Facilitate recovery specifications
  - Reliability and availability related
- Clear and concise (use Datalog, 5 lines/check)
- Design patterns


### Summary of results

- □ Target 3 cloud systems
  - HDFS (primary target), Cassandra, and ZooKeeper
- HDFS recovery bugs
  - Found 16 new bugs (+6 in newest)
- Problems found
  - Data loss
    - Buggy recovery wipes out all replicas
  - Unavailability
    - Broken rack-aware policy
    - Can't restart after failures


#### Outline

- Introduction
- **FATE** 
  - Failure IDs: abstraction for failure exploration
  - Pruning strategies
- DESTINI
- Evaluation
- Conclusion









Data Transfer Recovery:
Continue on surviving nodes (1, 2)


### Failures and FATE


#### Failures

- Anytime: different stages → different recovery
- Anywhere: N2 crash, and then N3
- Any type: bad disks, partitioned nodes/racks

#### FATE


- Systematically exercise multiple, diverse failures
- How? need to "remember" failures via failure IDs






#### Failure IDs

- Abstraction of I/O failures
- Building failure IDs
  - Intercept every I/O
  - Inject possible failures
    - Ex: crash, network partition, disk failure (LSE/corruption)



### Brute-force exploration



#### Outline


- Introduction
- - Failure IDs: abstraction of failures
  - Pruning strategies for failure exploration
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### Combinatorial explosion

- Exercised over 40,000 unique combinations of 1,
   2, and 3 failures per run
  - 80 hours of testing time!

#### **New challenge:**

Combinatorial explosion of multiple failures



2 failures / run

A1 A2

A1 B2

B1 A2

B1 B2

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
### Pruning multiple failures

- Properties of multiple failures
  - Pairwise dependent failure IDs
  - Pairwise independent failure IDs
- Goal: exercise distinct recovery behaviors
  - **Key:** some failures result in similar recovery
  - Result: > I0x faster, and found the same bugs

### Dependent failures


#### □ Failure dependency graph

- Inject single failures first
- Record subsequent dependent IDs
  - Ex: X depends on A
- Brute-force: AX, BX, CX, DX, CY, DY




#### □ Recovery clustering

- Two clusters: {X} and {X,Y}
- Only exercise distinct clusters
  - Pick a failureID that triggers a recovery cluster
  - Results: AX, CX, CY




### Independent failure IDs

- Independent combinations
  - Ex: FP = 2, N = 3
  - FP<sup>2</sup> x N (N 1)
- □ Symmetric code
  - Just pick two nodes
  - N  $(N-1) \rightarrow 2$
  - FP<sup>2</sup> x 2



### Independent failure IDs

- FP<sup>2</sup> bottleneck
  - **Ex:** FP = 4
  - Real example: FP = 15
- Recovery clustering
  - Cluster A and B if: fail(A) == fail(B)
  - Reduce FP<sup>2</sup> to FP<sup>2</sup> clustered
  - E.g. 15 FPs to 8 FPs<sub>clustered</sub>



### FATE Summary

#### Contributions

- Exercise multiple, diverse failures (via failure IDs)
- Pruning strategies (> 10x improvement)

#### Limitations

- I/O reordering
- Inclusion of states to failure IDs
- More failure modes
  - Transient, slow-down, and data-center partitioning

#### Outline


- Introduction
- □ FATE
- □ DESTINI: Declarative Testing Specifications
- Evaluation
- Conclusion

### DESTINI: declarative specs

- Is the system correct under failures?
  - Need to write specifications
  - FATE needs DESTINI

[It is] great to document (in a spec) the HDFS write protocol ...

..., but we shouldn't spend **too**much time on it, ... a formal spec
may be overkill for a protocol we
plan to deprecate imminently.




### Declarative specs

- How to write specifications?
  - Developer friendly (clear, concise, easy)
- □ Datalog: a declarative relational logic language
  - Easy to express logical relations
  - (just for writing specifications)

### Specs in DESTINI

- How to write specs?
  - Violations
  - Expectations
  - Facts
- ☐ How to write <u>recovery</u> specs?
  - "... recovery is under specified" [Hamilton]
  - Precise failure events
  - Precise check timings
- How to test implementation?
  - Interpose I/O calls (lightweight)
  - Deduce expectations and facts from I/O events




### Specification template

"Throw a violation if an expectation is different from the actual behavior"

```
violationTable(...) :-
expectationTable(...),
NOT-IN actualTable(...)
```

```
head():- predicates(), ...
:- derivation
, AND
```

### Data transfer recovery




incorrectNodes		
(Block, Node)		

<b>expectedNodes</b> (Block, Node)		
В	Node 1	
В	Node 2	

<b>actualNodes</b> (Block, Node)		
В	Node 1	
В	Node 2	

incorrectNodes(B, N) :- expectedNodes(B, N), NOT-IN actualNodes(B, N);

### Recovery bug



#### incorrectNodes

(Block, Node)

В

Node 2

<b>expectedNodes</b> (Block, Node)		
В	Node 1	
В	Node 2	

actual <b>N</b> odes		
(Block, Node)		
В	Node 1	

incorrectNodes(B, N) :- expectedNodes(B, N), NOT-IN actualNodes(B, N);

### Building expectations

- Ex: which nodes should have the blocks?
  - Deduce expectations from I/O events (italic)


<b>expectedNodes</b> (Block, Node)		
В	Node 1	
В	Node 2	
В	Node 3	


expectedNodes (B, N) :getBlockPipe (B, N);

```
getBlockPipe(...)
Give me 3 nodes for B
[Node1, Node2, Node3]
```

#1: incorrectNodes(B, N): expectedNodes(B, N), NOT-IN actualNodes(B, N);

### Updating expectations





DEL expectedNodes (B, N):expectedNodes (B, N),
fateCrashNode (N)



#1: incorrectNodes(B, N):- expectedNodes(B, N), NOT-IN actualNodes(B, N);

#2: expectedNodes(B, N) :- getBlockPipe(B,N);

#### Precise failure events

```
DEL expectedNodes (B, N):-
expectedNodes (B, N),

fateCrashNode (N),

writeStage (B, Stage),
Stage == "Data Transfer";
```

### Violation and checktiming

```
#1:
incorrectNodes(B, N) :-
expectedNodes(B, N),
NOT-IN actualNodes(B, N),
N),
completeBlock (B);
```

- Recovery ≠ invariant
  - If recovery is ongoing, invariants are violated
  - Don't want false alarms
- Need precise check timings
  - Ex: upon block completion

### DESTINI Summary

- □ Support recovery specs
  - Reliability and availability related
  - Clear and concise (use Datalog)
- Design patterns
  - Add detailed specs
  - Write specs from different views (global, client, ...)
  - Incorporate diverse failures (crashes, rack partitions)
  - ... more in the paper

### Outline


- Introduction
- FATE
- DESTINI
- □ Evaluation and conclusion

#### Evaluation

- Implementation complexity
  - ~6000 LOC in Java
- □ Target 3 popular cloud systems
  - HDFS (primary), ZooKeeper, Cassandra
- HDFS recovery bugs
  - Found 22 new bugs
    - 8 bugs due to multiple failures
    - Data loss, unavailability bugs
  - Reproduced 51 old bugs

### Availability bug

"If multiple racks are available (reachable), a block should be stored in a minimum of two racks"




### Availability bug

"If multiple racks are available (reachable), a block should be stored in a minimum of two racks"

 $\frac{\mathsf{errorSingleRack}(B) :- \mathsf{rackCnt}(B,\mathsf{Cnt}), \mathsf{Cnt} == 1, \mathsf{blkRacks}(B,R), \mathsf{connected}(R,Rb),}{\mathsf{endOfReplicationMonitor}(\_);}$ 

### Pruning Efficiency

- Reduce #experiments by an order of magnitude
  - Each experiment = 4-9 seconds
- Found the same number of bugs
  - (by experience)



### Specification simplicity

Framework	#Chks	Lines/Chk
D3S [NSDI '08]	10	<b>53</b>
Pip [NSDI '06]	44	43
WiDS [NSDI '07]	15	22
P2 Monitor [EuroSys '06]	11	12
DESTINI	74	5

Compared to other related work

#### Conclusion

- Cloud software systems
  - Must deal with HW failures

#### ☐ FATE and DESTINI

- Explore multiple, diverse failures systematically
- Facilitate concise recovery specifications
- A unified framework
  - FATE needs DESTINI
  - DESTINI needs FATE
- Real-world adoption in progress

## Thank you! Questions?





http://boom.cs.berkeley.edu

http://cs.wisc.edu/adsl