

ON THE DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF
CYBER-SECURITY USER STUDIES:
METHODOLOGY, CHALLENGES, AND
LESSONS LEARNED

Malek Ben Salem & Salvatore J. Stolfo
CSET 2011

INTRODUCTION

◎ Problem


- Lack of masquerader data
- Schonlau data set not appropriate

◎ Objectives

- Test the conjecture that extensive search reveals an attacker's malicious intent
- Evaluate whether decoy files embedded in a local file system can be used to detect masqueraders


◎ Steps

- Conduct user studies to validate conjecture
- Gather new dataset including data from “normal users” and masqueraders



USER STUDY METHODOLOGY

- ◎ State hypotheses
 - Experimental hypothesis
 - Null hypothesis
- ◎ Identify experimental variables
 - Independent variable
 - Dependent variables
 - Confounding variables
- ◎ Build control groups
 - Scenario narratives to control user's intent
- ◎ Determine sampling procedure
- ◎ Estimate sample size
 - Power analysis



USER STUDY EXECUTION

- Obtain IRB approval early
- Develop/deploy the right sensors for data collection
 - Right unique IDs
 - Right platform
- Pilot experiment
- Reduce confounds and bias
- Sanitize data and have users sign waivers
- Validate collected data after reviewing post-experiment questionnaires

HYPOTHESES

- ⦿ Experimental hypothesis

- If the intent of a masquerader is malicious, then they will engage in a *significant* search activity on the victim's system.

- ⦿ Null hypothesis

- The manipulation of the masquerader's intent does not have any significant effect on the masquerader's search behavior.

→The observed significant effect during the experiment can be attributed to the manipulation of the masquerader's intent and cannot be the result of pure chance.

IDENTIFY EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES

- ◎ **Independent variable**
 - Only variable manipulated by researcher, all others are kept constant
 - Need one control group for each value of the independent variable
 - User's intent
- ◎ **Dependent variables**
 - Observed behavioral feature to be measured by researcher
 - Tightly dependent on independent variable
 - User's search behavior
- ◎ **Confounding variables**
 - Random variables affecting observed behavioral feature
 - Need to be eliminated or at least minimized
 - E.g. Awareness of monitoring , familiarity with desktop search tools

BUILD CONTROL GROUPS

- Control user's intent through scenario narratives
 - One narrative for each control group
 - Milgram's experiment
- Scenario narrative requirements
 - Generalizable: representative of masquerade attack
 - Conforming to threat model
 - Assumptions should be clearly stated
 - Detailed
 - Includes answers to anticipated questions to limit verbal communication with study participants
 - Minimizes user bias
 - Easily executable
 - E.g. time-limited

SCENARIO NARRATIVES

- ◉ User has access to coworker's system for 15 minutes while coworker is away
- ◉ Malicious, benign, and neutral scenarios

| Experimental Variable | Value | Same/ Different |
|------------------------------|---|----------------------------|
| Scope | Local File System of Colleague's Computer | Same |
| Environmental Constraints | IDS Lab Computer | Same |
| Desktop Configuration | Same Recent Documents and Applications | Same |
| Time Constraints | 15 minutes | Same |
| Intent | Malicious, Benign, or Neutral | Different |

DETERMINE SAMPLING PROCEDURE

- Objective: Increase the sensitivity of the experiment
- Means: Reduce uncontrolled variability
- Subject variability makes up the largest source of variability
- Sampling procedures
 - Use same subject in all treatment conditions
 - Violates assumption in our threat model that attacker is not familiar with victim's file system
 - Use homogeneous group of subjects
 - Similar characteristics relevant to experiment
 - Use several small subject sets
 - Sets highly homogeneous within one set, but widely varying between sets

PERFORM POWER ANALYSIS

◎ Power

- Indicates how statistically significant experiment's results are
- Desirable values: 0.5-0.9
- Used to determine required sample size for each treatment condition
- Higher power requires larger samples

◎ Adequate sample size* depends on

- Number of independent variable and number of treatment conditions
- Desired effect size that researchers wishes to detect
- Desired power

*KEPPEL, G. Design and analysis : a researcher's handbook. Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004.

REDUCE CONFOUNDS AND BIAS

- Reduce subject variability
 - Homogeneous group of user study participants
- Reduce experimental treatment variability
 - Same desktop for all experiments
 - Same file system contents: automated collected data upload
 - Same recent documents opened for each participant
 - Same researcher

USER STUDY EXECUTION

- Obtain IRB approval
 - Lengthy, iterative process
 - Required very detailed information
 - e.g. call for participation, data items collected
- Develop/deploy sensors for data collection
 - Study technology market trends to select the right development platform
- Pilot experiment
 - Learn sources of variability
- Sanitize data
 - Data collected for same user from different sensors
 - Users did not take advantage of sanitization functions provided
- Review post-experiment questionnaires
 - Extract trends, eliminate invalid cases

RUU (ARE YOU YOU?) DATASET

⦿ Characteristics

- Larger than 10GBytes in size
- More than 10 million records
- Data from 18 “normal” users
 - 4 days of data on average
- Data from 40 “masqueraders”

⦿ Results


- Search behavior reveals malicious intent
- Search behavior profiling detects 100% of masquerade attacks with 1.12% false positives
- Decoy files can be used to detect all masqueraders within 10 minutes

RUU SAMPLE RECORD: REGISTRY ACCESS


| Column¹ | Value |
|---------------------------|--|
| Syshash | 0cc7ebd580b39bb037627c2a71c979 |
| Auditaction | QueryValue |
| Processname | explorer.exe |
| Path | HKCR\CLSID\871C5380-42A0-1069-A2EA-08002B30309D\ShellFolder\Attributes |
| Stringreturn | SUCCESS |
| PID | 408 |
| PPID | -1 |
| Timestamp | 2009-12-09 21:05:46 |

RESULTS

- Search behavior can be used to reveals attacker's malicious intent
- User search behavior profiling achieves 100% detection rate of masquerade attacks with 1.12% false positives




RESULTS: DISTRIBUTION OF FILE SYSTEM NAVIGATIONS ACTIONS



BEN-SALEM, M., AND STOLFO, S. J. Modeling user search-behavior for masquerade detection. In To Appear in the Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (Heidelberg, September 2011), Springer.


RESULTS: DISTRIBUTION OF FILE TOUCHES




BEN-SALEM, M., AND STOLFO, S. J. Modeling user search-behavior for masquerade detection. In To Appear in the Proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection (Heidelberg, September 2011), Springer.

RESULTS

- Search behavior can be used to reveals attacker's malicious intent
- User search behavior profiling achieves 100% detection rate of masquerade attacks with 1.12% false positives
- Decoy files can be used to detect all masqueraders within 10 minutes at most
- More than 40% of masqueraders detected during the first minute of their fraudulent activity




RESULTS: DECOY ACCESS MONITORING




BEN-SALEM, M., AND STOLFO, S. J. Decoy document deployment for effective masquerade attack detection. In DIMVA'11: Proceedings of the Eighth Conference on Detection of Intrusions and Malware & Vulnerability Assessment (Heidelberg, July 2011), Springer, pp. 35 - 54.

RESULTS

- Search behavior can be used to reveals attacker's malicious intent
- User search behavior profiling achieves 100% detection rate of masquerade attacks with 1.12% false positives
- Decoy files can be used to detect all masqueraders within 10 minutes at most
- More than 40% of masqueraders detected during the first minute of their fraudulent activity
- Combining decoys monitoring with search behavior profiling improves accuracy when compared to search profiling alone



RESULTS: SEARCH PROFILING & DECOY ACCESS MONITORING



BEN-SALEM, M. AND STOLFO, S. J. Combining a baiting and a user search profiling techniques for masquerade detection. In Columbia University Computer Science Department, Technical Report # cucs-018-11 (2011).

LESSONS LEARNED

- ◎ **Compliance-related**
 - Initiate IRB review early
 - List a larger sample of user study subjects
 - Have users sign waivers
- ◎ **Scientific**
 - List all assumptions made about users in study scenarios
 - Think carefully about ways for reducing variability and baselining users
 - Perform a power analysis
- ◎ **Practical**
 - Anticipate technology market trends
 - Pilot experiment
 - Have participants fill post-experiment questionnaires

REFERENCES

KEPPEL, G. Design and analysis : a researcher's handbook. Pearson Prentice Hall, 2004.

MILGRAM, S. Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. Harpercollins, New York, January 1974.

PEARSON, E. S., AND HARTLEY, H. O. Charts of the power function for analysis of variance tests, derived from the non-central F-distribution. Biometrika 38, 1 (July 1951), 112-130.