



The Virtual Power System Testbed (VPST) and Inter- Testbed Integration

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Information Trust Institute

Providing World-Wide Excellence in Information Trust and Security

Institute Vision:

Trust in Society

Institute Personnel:

Core faculty from CS and ECE

95+ faculty and senior researchers from 21 Dept's.

Institute Themes:

- Critical Applications, Infrastructures, and Homeland Defense
- Embedded and Enterprise Computing
- Multimedia and Distributed Systems



Institute Centers

- Boeing Trusted Software Center
- CAESAR: the Center for Autonomous Engineering Systems and Robotics
- Center for Information Forensics
- NCASSR: the National Center for Advanced Secure Systems
- NSA Center for Information Assurance Education
- **TCIP: Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid**
- Trusted ILLIAC Center

Institute Highlights

- Established, rapidly growing effort
- Large, diverse community of researchers
- Societal and industrial problems
- Major corporate partnerships
- Led by the College of Engineering at UIUC



TCIP Center: Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for Power

TCIP secures the devices, communications, and data systems that make up the power grid, to ensure trustworthy operation during normal conditions, cyber attacks and/or power emergencies.

William H. Sanders, Director

Organization -- 19 Faculty and Senior Staff; 30 Graduate Research Assistants from Univ. of Illinois, Dartmouth, Cornell, and Washington State University

Focus Research Areas

- Developing a secure and reliable computing base and providing foundations for system-wide security and reliability.
- Designing, implementing and integrating communications and control protocols that provide secure, timely and reliable data collection and control.
- Providing evaluative methodologies and tools for modeling, simulation, emulation and experimentation for security technologies for the power grid.
- Providing education, outreach and training at the K-12, undergraduate, and graduate levels and to prepare the next generation workforce.

TCIP Industry Advisory Board


Comprises over 30 industry organizations, representing the entire spectrum of the power industry.



VPST - Introduction

- VPST - Designed to support exploration of security technologies being developed for large scale power grid infrastructure
- Integrates the following
 - Real Power Equipment
 - Electrical Simulations (PowerWorld)
 - Computation/Communication Simulation (RINSE)
 - Secure remote connectivity to other resources


VPST - High Level Overview



RINSE objectives

- Modeling methodologies for high performance / high capability network analysis
 - Model composition to support nearly transparent parallel processing
 - Multi-resolution modeling of traffic
 - mixed/fluid models of transport protocols, routers, links
 - immersive faster-than-real-time simulation for exercises
 - very fast net-wide background bandwidth use computation
 - x1000s speedup over optimized full-resolution model
 - Multi-resolution modeling of network topology

RINSE Host Architecture




VPST Motivation (SCADA context)

- Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
 - Simplified, a hybrid of physical devices and the software controlling and monitoring them
- SCADA systems have a rising need for security
- Scale and operational context makes using actual equipment infeasible in the long run
- SCADA resources have a relatively high barrier to entry
- Emulation alleviates part of this concern, but accurate models are needed
- Other testbeds have valuable resources as well, and we'd like to leverage that

VPST Architecture

- VPST-E
 - Electrical powergrid simulation
 - PowerWorld (can simulate over 100,000 buses)
- VPST-C
 - RINSE-based network simulator
 - Trusted ILLIAC (can simulate over 1 million devices)
- VPST-R-local
 - Real SCADA devices in TCIP lab
- VPST-R-Remote
 - Other SCADA/security testbeds
 - DETER, NSTB, VCSE
 - “Super node”



Interconnection Requirements

- Secure Connectivity
 - May face threats from external cyber-attack and internal malicious code
 - Several layers of protection similar to OPSAID
 - Transmission security (IPSec and SSL)
 - Authentication and access control at all accessing points (IPSec)
 - Traffic isolation (private network)
 - Intrusion detection if necessary (Snort)

Performance Requirements

- Performance
 - Overcome latency across multiple testbeds
 - Inter-Testbed Connector (ITC), single point of contact and then distributes the workload
 - Two connections between each testbed
 - Control channel
 - Aggregated data channel
 - Use lookahead algorithms to keep the simulation at least as fast as real time (emulated devices)
 - Must use highly scalable simulation environment
 - VPST-C (RINSE network simulator)
 - VPST-E (PowerWorld simulator)

Resource Requirements

- Resource Allocation
 - Flexible configuration
 - Accurate resource mapping that can balance customizability and speed
 - Design of ITC takes decentralized approach and is decomposed into modules
 - VPST must intelligently partition simulation models and expand that to heterogeneous testbeds

Reproducibility Requirements


- Reproducibility
 - Dynamics of SCADA networks (size of network, type of physical medium, time-varying traffic patterns) requires precise experiment reproduction
 - VPST-C enhances local reproducibility with fully configurable and controllable parameter space
 - Human-in-the-loop interaction necessitates that parameters can be changed online and recorded for later reproduction (VPST uses tcpdump/libpcap files for network traffic capture)

Fidelity Requirements


- Fidelity
 - VPST must be as transparent as possible to real devices
 - Realistic data patterns and interactions
 - Latency
 - Accurate simulated hosts
 - Counterpoint to performance, must be addressed carefully

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Inter-Testbed Connector (ITC) Architecture



Inter-Testbed Connector (ITC) Architecture

- Simulation Control Plane
 - ITC Controller
 - Exchanges control commands with a remote ITC
 - Collects/distributes commands on local control plane
 - Resource Allocator
 - Load balancing and allocation
 - Verify correctness of topology mapping
 - Guarantee IP uniqueness/mapping
 - Resource configurator
 - Uses DML to configure hosts, links, traffic, etc.

Inter-Testbed Connector (ITC) Architecture

- Simulation Control Plane (continued)
 - Run-time controller
 - Control experiment online
 - E.g. launch DoS attacks, altering data polling behavior
 - Error Detector
 - Detect host failures, asynchronization, out-of-bound parameters, etc.
 - Respond by allocating extra resources, generating alerts, writing to logs or terminating/restarting experiment
 - Data Plane Configurator
 - Issue controls to the data plane at initialization, run-time, and cleanup stages

Inter-Testbed Connector (ITC) Architecture

- Model Data Plane
 - Traffic Distributor
 - Bridges traffic across interconnected testbeds
 - Minimizes the number of physical links by using a “super node”
 - Measurement Reporter
 - Collects metrics
 - Leverages both local and remote collection

Use Case 1

- Training and Human-in-the-loop Event Analysis
 - Mid-western blackout of 2003
 - Operators need to be trained with full situational awareness
 - Requirements
 - Secure Connectivity for sensitive information
 - Reproducibility for event replay and analysis of the impact of human decisions
 - Scalability for large-scale power systems
 - Fidelity to ensure realistic scenarios

Use Case 2

- Analysis of Incremental Deployment
 - Old and new technologies must co-exist
 - DNP3SA, for instance, must be tested on a large-scale heterogeneous environment before being deployed
 - Requirements
 - Reproducibility for ensuring new technology is the root cause of change
 - High performance for accurate scale models
 - Fidelity to ensure new technology behaves the same as in the wild

Use Case 3

- Attack Robustness Analysis
 - Simulation & Emulation can combine to test a proposed defense against an attack
 - Goals
 - Leverage something like DETER for cyber-attack capabilities
 - Use National Labs for various SCADA equipment
 - VPST-C is the “master” coordinating and providing the modeling and analysis for the experiment
 - Requirements
 - Secure connectivity to provide containment
 - Reproducibility to allow attack replay against various defenses
 - Fidelity to ensure defense results are real

Difficult Problems

- Coordinated resource allocation and aggregation
- Time contraction and dilation
- Representative traffic generation and modeling
 - Production SCADA networks are generally very closed
 - Responses can be highly contextual leading to complex models
- Interconnected testbed GOTCHA's
 - “virtual” attacks become real

Summary

- Shown the need to integrate multiple testbeds for SCADA networks and requirements/difficulties therein
- Some aspects currently implemented, more to come
- Future work
 - To develop a black-box implementation of the ITC
 - To develop a mechanism to ensure efficient WAN transmission via coordinated control and integration

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Thanks!

