USENIX 2005 Annual Technical Conference, General Track Abstract
Pp. 163178 of the Proceedings
Attrition Defenses for a Peer-to-Peer Digital Preservation System
T.J. Giuli, Stanford University; Petros Maniatis, Intel Research; Mary Baker, Hewlett-Packard Labs; David S. H. Rosenthal, Stanford University; Mema Roussopoulos, Harvard University
AbstractIn peer-to-peer systems, attrition attacks
include both traditional, network-level denial of service attacks as
well as application-level attacks in which malign peers conspire to waste
loyal peers' resources.
We describe several defenses for the LOCKSS peer-to-peer digital
preservation system that help ensure that application-level attrition attacks even
adversaries are less effective than simple network-level attacks, and that
network-level attacks must be intense, widespread, and prolonged to
impair the system.
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