Tracking Emigrant Data via Transient Provenance

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Introduction

- Data leaks are harmful for companies and government agencies
- Figuring out who leaked your data and how is hard
- If a leak is found, information gathering is critical
 - Who could have leaked the data?
 - When did the data leave the system?
 - What else did the user access at the time?
- Data provenance can be extended to track emigrant data







Assumptions

- All data is kept on a central storage system
- Provenance store uses the PASS framework
- High Performance Computing (HPC) environment
- Clients connect over the network
 - NFS, CIFS, SSH, FTP
- Adversary is a trusted user with malicious intent







Transient Provenance

- Data can leave central storage in two ways
 - Copied or moved to an directly connected external drive
 - Copied over a network connection
- Emigrant data is tracked via ghost objects
- Ghost objects represent a period of time when data has left the central storage system
- Ghost objects differ from regular provenance
 - Do not track data ancestry
 - Are not meant to be immutable







Tracking Data Leaks

- Ghost objects can be used to identify suspect users
- Each ghost represents a period of time during which data were accessible from outside the provenance system's control
- Querying over the provenance graph for leaked data will return all relevant ghost objects
 - Users who accessed the data
 - How the data left the central storage system
 - Where the leaked data went (external drive or IP address)







Conclusion

- Data provenance can be extended to track emigrant data via ghost objects
- Ghost objects are used to track when data emigrates from a storage system
- Querying ghost objects can identify sources of data leaks
 - Identify potential suspects
 - Provide timeframe for the leak and the set of data





