

Certifying Program Execution with Secure Processors

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
Motivation

- All PCs may soon include trusted computing HW
- Potential impact far greater than copy-protection!


*Goal: explore appropriate hardware
and software design*

Secure Remote Login


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Login session




Trusted server



Partial Solutions

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Trusted server



Attack

Solution

Network sniffing	Encrypt session (e.g. ssh)
Fake login prompt	One-time phrase from server
Sniffing login password	One-time password; Personal smart-cards

We Won't Try To Solve

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Trusted server




- Modified keyboard or display
 - To steal keystrokes and data
- A camera can spy even personal laptops

Hard-to-Prevent Attacks

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
Trusted server



- Attacks by owner of the terminal
 - Install bad ssh software
 - Install bad operating system/device driver
 - Even w/ trusted OS, can snoop memory with DMA

Can Trusted Computing Help?

Microsoft Palladium (NGSCB)



- Secure boot
 - Keep fingerprints of BIOS, B/L, Nexus in secure chip
- Attestation
 - Nexus computes fingerprint of secure app
 - Secure chip signs all fingerprints
- Keyboard driver in Nexus
- Modified HW guides DMA

Remote Login w/ Palladium

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Nonce




Attestation certificate



One-time phrase



Trusted server



Is the terminal's
HW/SW trusted?

- Server looks for trusted
 - Chip, BIOS, boot loader, Nexus, ssh

Palladium Pros

- Pros
 - Detect un-trusted chip, BIOS, boot loader
 - Detect un-trusted Nexus and ssh
 - Prevent DMA of memory of trusted apps

Palladium Pros and Cons

- Pros
 - Detect un-trusted chip, BIOS, boot loader
 - Detect un-trusted Nexus and ssh
 - Prevent DMA of memory of trusted apps
- Cons
 - Can you keep the Nexus small?

Palladium Pros and Cons


- Pros
 - Detect un-trusted chip, BIOS, boot loader
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- Cons
 - Can you keep the Nexus small?
 - Can you verify Windows' services?

Palladium Pros and Cons

- Pros
 - Detect un-trusted chip, BIOS, boot loader
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 - Prevent DMA of memory of trusted apps
- Cons
 - Can you keep the Nexus small?
 - Can you verify Windows' services?
 - Non-DMA attacks on memory

How Can We Improve
Palladium's Security and
Verifiability?

Use Small □-kernel



- □-kernel allows attestation of all OS modules

Flexible Security Boundary

- Secure Remote Login's security boundary
 - ssh program
 - □-kernel
 - keyboard driver
 - BIOS, B/L, secure chip
- Some apps need more, some less
 - E.g. pager, network stack

□-kernel Challenges

- Can we maintain a modular system?
 - Small kernel & OS modules - verifiability


□-kernel Challenges

- Can we maintain a modular system?
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- What about performance?
 - Careful engineering & SMT?

□-kernel Challenges


- Can we maintain a modular system?
 - Small kernel & OS modules - verifiability
- What about performance?
 - Careful engineering & SMT?
- What about popular apps?

Un-trusted Apps Run In VM



XOM (Lie et al 00)

Prevents DRAM Attacks




- Processor decrypts copy-protected program
- HW/FW implements crypto-paging (Yee 94)
- Cannot easily find out what OS is running

Borrow Crypto-Paging


- Use tamper-resistant processor
 - Cache is trusted and safe
- Run \square -kernel in secure processor
- \square -kernel authenticates data to/from DRAM

Memory Authentication

- Merkle tree
 - Tree of hashes
 - Parent authenticates children
 - Leaves authenticate physical memory
 - Secure processor stores root
 - Trap handler uses/updates tree when loading or evicting cached data



Cerium



Secure Remote Login w/ Cerium


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Nonce



Trusted server



Secure Remote Login w/ Cerium

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
Nonce



Signed certificate



Trusted server



**Certificate contains:
nonce and fingerprints of
BIOS, B/L, □-kernel, user-
level keyboard driver, ssh**

Secure Remote Login w/ Cerium

Alice @ Internet Cafe



Nonce



Signed certificate



One-time phrase



Trusted server



Cerium Enables Many Apps

- User can find out if a computer executed the user's program faithfully!
- Many useful applications
 - Secure remote execution (e.g. SETI@home)
 - Secure P2P network

Conclusion

- Trusted computing HW enables new apps
- Cerium supports Secure Remote Login
 - Merges good ideas from Palladium & XOM
 - Provides security and verifiability
- We should explore how to use trusted computing HW to build cool systems!