

QUIRE: Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems

Michael Dietz
mdietz@rice.edu

Shashi Shekhar
shashi.shekhar@rice.edu

Yuliy Pisetsky
yuliy@rice.edu

Anhei Shu
as43@rice.edu

Dan S. Wallach
dwallach@rice.edu

Abstract

Smartphone apps are often granted to privilege to run with access to the network and sensitive local resources. This makes it difficult for remote endpoints to place any trust in the provenance of network connections originating from a user’s device. Even on the phone, different apps with distinct privilege sets can communicate with one another. This can allow one app to trick another into improperly exercising its privileges (resulting in a confused deputy attack). In QUIRE, we engineered two new security mechanisms into Android to address these issues. First, QUIRE tracks the call chain of on device IPCs, allowing an app the choice of operating with the reduced privileges of its callers or exercising its full privilege set by acting explicitly on its own behalf. Second, a lightweight signature scheme allows any app to create a signed statement that can be verified by any app on the same phone. Both of these mechanisms are reflected in network RPCs. This allows remote systems visibility into the state of the phone when the RPC was made. We demonstrate the usefulness of QUIRE with two example applications: an advertising service that runs advertisements separately from their hosting applications, and a remote payment system. We show that QUIRE’s performance overhead is minimal.

1 Introduction

On a smartphone, applications are typically given broad permissions to make network connections, access local data repositories, and issue requests to other apps on the device. For Apple’s iPhone, the only mechanism that protects users from malicious apps is the vetting process for an app to get into Apple’s app store. (Apple also has the ability to remotely delete apps, although it’s something of an emergency-only system.) However, any iPhone app might have its own security vulnerabilities, perhaps through a buffer overflow attack, which can give an attacker full access to the entire phone.

The Android platform, in contrast, has no significant vetting process before an app is posted to the Android Market. Instead, the Android OS insulates apps from one another and the underlying Android runtime. Applications from different authors run with different Unix user ids, containing the damage if an application is compromised. (In this aspect, Android follows a design similar to SubOS [20].) However, this does nothing to defend a trusted app from being manipulated by a malicious app via IPC (i.e., a confused deputy attack [18], intent stealing/spoofing [9], or other privilege escalation attacks [11]). Likewise, there is no mechanism to prevent an IPC callee from misrepresenting the intentions of its caller to a third party.

This mutual distrust arises in many mobile applications. Consider the example of a mobile advertisement system. An application hosting an ad would rather the ad run in a distinct process, with its own user-id, so bugs in the ad system do not impact the hosting app. Similarly, the ad system might not trust its host to display the ad correctly, and must be concerned with hosts that try to generate fake clicks to inflate their ad revenue.

To address these concerns, we introduce QUIRE, a low-overhead security mechanism that provides important context in the form of *provenance* and OS managed data security to local and remote apps communicating by IPC and RPC respectively. QUIRE uses two techniques to provide security to communicating applications.

First, QUIRE transparently annotates IPCs occurring within the phone such that the recipient of an IPC request can observe the full call chain associated with the request. When an application wishes to make a network RPC, it might well connect to a raw network socket, but it would lack credentials that we can build into the OS, which can speak to the state of an RPC in a way that an app cannot forge. (This contextual information can be thought of as a generalization of the information provided by the recent HTTP Origin header [2], used by web servers to help defeat cross-site request forgery (CSRF)

attacks.)

Second, QUIRE uses simple cryptographic mechanisms to protect data moving over IPC and RPC channels. QUIRE provides a mechanism for an app to tag an object with cheap message authentication codes, using keys that are shared with a trusted OS service. When data annotated in this manner moves off the device, the OS can verify the signature and speak to the integrity of the message in the RPC.

Applications. QUIRE enables a variety of useful applications. Consider the case of in-application advertising. A large number of free applications include advertisements from services like AdMob. AdMob is presently implemented as a library that runs in the same process as the application hosting the ad, creating trivial opportunities for the application to spoof information to the server, such as claiming an ad is displayed when it isn't, or claiming an ad was clicked when it wasn't. In QUIRE, the advertisement service runs as a separate application and interacts with the displaying app via IPC calls. The remote application's server can now reliably distinguish RPC calls coming from its trusted agent, and can further distinguish legitimate clicks from forgeries, because every UI event is tagged with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) [21], for which the OS will vouch.

Consider also the case of payment services. Many smartphone apps would like a way to sell things, leveraging payment services from PayPal, Google Checkout, and other such services. We would like to enable an application to send a payment request to a local payment agent, who can then pass the request on to its remote server. The payment agent must be concerned with the main app trying to issue fraudulent payment requests, so it needs to validate requests with the user. Similarly, the main app might be worried about the payment agent misbehaving, so it wants to create unforgeable "purchase orders" which the payment app cannot corrupt. All of this can be easily accomplished with our new mechanisms.

Challenges. For QUIRE to be successful, we must accomplish a number of goals. Our design must be sufficiently general to capture a variety of use cases for augmented internal and remote communication. Toward that end, we build on many concepts from Taos [38], including its compound principals and logic of authentication (see Section 2). Our implementation must be fast. Every IPC call in the system must be annotated and must be subsequently verifiable without having a significant impact on throughput, latency, or battery life. (Section 3 describes QUIRE's implementation, and Section 5 presents our performance measurements.) QUIRE expands on related work from a variety of fields, including existing

Android research, web security, distributed authentication logics, and trusted platform measurements (see Section 6). We expect QUIRE to serve as a platform for future work in secure UI design, as a substrate for future research in web browser engineering, and as starting point for a variety of applications (see Section 7).

2 Design

Fundamentally, the design goal of QUIRE is to allow apps to reason about the call-chain and data provenance of requests, occurring on both a host platform via IPC or on a remote server via RPC, before committing to any security-relevant decisions. This design goal is shared by a variety of other systems, ranging from Java's stack inspection [34, 35] to many newer systems that rely on data tainting or information flow control (see, e.g., [24, 25, 13]). In QUIRE, much like in stack inspection, we wish to support legacy code without much, if any modification. However, unlike stack inspection, we don't want to modify the underlying system to annotate and track every method invocation, nor would we like to suffer the runtime costs of dynamic data tainting as in TaintDroid [13]. We also wish to operate correctly with apps that have natively compiled code, not just Java code (an issue with traditional stack inspection and with TaintDroid). We observe that in order to accomplish these goals, we only need to track calls across IPC boundaries, which happen far less frequently than method invocations, and which already must pay significant overheads for data marshaling, context switching, and copying.

Stack inspection has the property that the available privileges at the end of a call chain represent the intersection of the privileges of every app along the chain (more on this in Section 2.2), which is good for preventing confused deputy attacks, but doesn't solve a variety of other problems, such as validating the integrity of individual data items as they are passed from one app to another or over the network. For that, we need semantics akin to digital signatures, but we need to be much more efficient as attaching digital signatures to all IPC calls would be too slow (more on this in Section 2.3).

Versus information flow. A design that focuses on IPC boundaries is necessarily less precise than dynamic taint analysis, but it's also incredibly flexible. We can avoid the need to annotate code with static security policies, as would be required in information flow-typed systems like Jif [26]. We similarly do not need to poly-instantiate services to ensure that each instance only handles a single security label as in systems like DStar/HiStar [39] or IPC Inspection [15]. Instead, in QUIRE, an application which handles requests from mul-

multiple callers will pass along an object annotated with the originator’s context when it makes downstream requests on behalf of the original caller.

Likewise, where a dynamic tainting system like TaintDroid [13] would generally allow a sensitive operation, like learning the phone’s precise GPS location, to occur, but would forbid it from flowing to an unprivileged app; QUIRE will carry the unprivileged context through to the point where the dangerous operation is about to happen, and will then forbid the operation. An information flow approach is thus more likely to catch corner cases (e.g., where an app caches location data, so no privileged call is ever performed), but is also more likely to have false positives (where it must conservatively err on the side of flagging a flow that is actually just fine). A programmer in an information flow system would need to tag these false positive corner cases as acceptable, whereas a programmer using QUIRE would need to add additional security checks to corner cases that would otherwise be allowed.

2.1 Authentication logic and cryptography

In order to reason about the semantics of QUIRE, we need a formal model to express what the various operations in QUIRE will do. Toward that end, we use the Abadi et al. [1] (hereafter “ABLP”) logic of authentication, as used in Taos [38]. In this logic, *principals* make *statements*, which can include various forms of quotation (“Alice **says** Bob **says** X”) and authorization (e.g., “Alice **says** Bob **speaks for** Alice”). ABLP nicely models the behavior of cryptographic operations, where cryptographic key material speaks for other principals, and we can use this model to reason about cross-process communication on a device as well as over the network.

For the remainder of the current section, we will flesh out QUIRE’s IPC and RPC design in terms of ABLP and the cryptographic mechanisms we have adopted.

2.2 IPC provenance

Android IPC background. The application separation that Android relies on to protect apps from one another has an interesting side effect; whenever two applications wish to communicate they must do so via Android’s Binder IPC mechanism. All cross application communication occurs over these Binder IPC channels, from clicks delivered from the OS to an app to requests for sensitive resources like a users list of contacts or GPS location. It is therefore critically important to protect these inter-application communication channels against attack.




Figure 1: Defeating confused deputy attacks.

QUIRE IPC design. The goal of QUIRE’s IPC provenance system is to allow endpoints that protect sensitive resources, like a user’s fine grained GPS data or contact information, to reason about the complete IPC call-chain of a request for the resource before granting access to the requesting app.

QUIRE realizes this goal by modifying the Android IPC layer to automatically build calling context as an IPC call-chain is formed. Consider a call-chain where three principals *A*, *B*, and *C*, are communicating. If *A* calls *B* who then calls *C* without keeping track of the call-stack, *C* only knows that *B* initiated a request to it, not that the call from *A* prompted *B* to make the call to *C*. This loss of context can have significant security implications in a system like Android where permissions are directly linked to the identity of the principal requesting access to a sensitive resource.

To address this, QUIRE’s design is for any given callee to retain its caller’s call-chain and pass this to every downstream callee. The callee will automatically have its caller’s principal prepended to the ABLP statement. In our above scenario, *C* will receive a statement “*B says A says Ok*”, where **Ok** is an abstract token representing that the given resource is authorized to be used. It’s now the burden of *C* (or QUIRE’s privilege manager, operating on *C*’s behalf) to prove **Ok**. As Wallach et al. [35] demonstrated, this is equivalent to validating that each principal in the calling chain is individually allowed to perform the action in question.

Confused and intentional deputies. The current Android permission system ties an app’s permissions to the unique user-id it is assigned at install time. The Android system then resolves the user-id of an app requesting access to a sensitive resource into a permission set that determines if the app’s request for the resource will suc-

ceed. This approach to permissions enables applications that have permission to access a resource to act as both intentional and confused deputies. The current Android permission model assumes that all apps act as intentional deputies, that is they resolve and check the user-id and permission set of a calling application that triggers the callee app to issue a request for a sensitive resource before issuing the request to the resource.

An app that protects a sensitive resource and blindly handles requests from callees to the protected resource is said to be acting as a *confused deputy* because it is unaware that it is doing dangerous actions on behalf of a caller who doesn't have the necessary permissions. In reality, app developers rarely intend to create a confused deputy; instead, they may simply fail to consider that a dangerous operation is in play, and thus fail to take any precautions.

The goal of the IPC extensions in QUIRE are to provide enough additional security context to prevent confused deputy attacks while still enabling an application to act as an intentional deputy if it chooses to do so. To defeat confused deputy attacks, we simply check if any one of the principals in the call chain is not privileged for the action being taken; in these cases, permission is denied. Figure 1 shows this in the context of an evil application, lacking fine-grained location privileges, which is trying to abuse the privileges of a trusted mapping program, which happens to have that privilege. The mapping application, never realizing that its helpful API might be a security vulnerability, naively and automatically passes along the call chain along to the location service. The location service then uses the call chain to prove (or disprove) that the request for fine-grained location show be allowed.

As with traditional stack inspection, there will be times that an app genuinely wishes to exercise a privilege, regardless of its caller's lack of the same privilege. Stack inspection solves this with an *enablePrivilege* primitive that, in the ABLP logic, simply doesn't pass along the caller's call stack information. The callee, after privileges are enabled, gets only the immediate caller's identity. (In the example of Figure 1, the trusted mapper would drop the evil app from the call chain, and the location provider would only hear that the trusted mapper application wishes to use the service.)

Our design is, in effect, an example of the "security passing style" transformation [35], where security beliefs are passed explicitly as an IPC argument rather than passed implicitly as annotations on the call stack. One beneficial consequence of this is that a callee might well save the statement made by its caller and reuse them at a later time, perhaps if they queue requests for later processing, in order to properly modulate the privilege level of outgoing requests.

Security analysis. While apps, by default, will pass along call chain information without modification, QUIRE allows a caller to forge the identities of its antecedent callers. They are simply strings passed along from caller to callee. Enabling this misrepresentation would seem to enable serious security vulnerabilities, but there is no *incentive* for a caller to lie, since the addition of any antecedent principals *strictly reduces the privileges of the caller*. Of course, there will be circumstances when a caller wants to take an action that will result in increased privileges for a downstream callee. Toward that end, QUIRE provides a mechanism for verifiable statements (see Section 2.3).

In our design, we require the callee to learn the caller's identity in an unforgeable fashion. The callee then prepends the "Caller **says**" tokens to the statement it hears from the caller, using information that is available as part of every Android Binder IPC, any lack of privileges on the caller's part will be properly reflected when the privileges for the trusted operation are later evaluated.

Furthermore, our design is lightweight; we can construct and propagate IPC call chains with little impact on IPC performance (see Section 5).

2.3 Verifiable statements

Stack inspection semantics are helpful, but are not sufficient for many security needs. We envision a variety of scenarios where we will need semantics equivalent to digital signatures, but with much better performance than public-key cryptographic operations.

Definition. A *verifiable statement* is a 3-tuple $[P, M, A(M)_P]$ where P is the principal that said message M , and $A(M)_P$ is an authentication token that can be used by the Authority Manager OS service to verify P said M . In ABLP, this tuple represents the statement " P says M ."

In order to operate without requiring slow public-key cryptographic operations, we have two main choices. We could adopt some sort of central registry of statements, perhaps managed inside the kernel. This would require a context switch every time a new statement is made, and it would also require the kernel to store these statements in a cache with some sort of timeout strategy to avoid a memory use explosion.

The alternative is to adopt a symmetric-key cryptographic mechanism, such as message authentication codes (MAC). MAC functions, like HMAC-SHA1, run several orders of magnitude faster than digital signature functions like DSA, but MAC functions require a shared key between the generator and verifier of a MAC. To avoid an N^2 key explosion, we must have every application share a key with a central, trusted authority man-

ager. As such, any app can produce a statement “App says M ”, purely by computing a MAC with its secret key. However, for a second app to verify it, it must send the statement to the authority manager. If the authority manager says the MAC is valid, then the second app will believe the veracity of the statement.

There are two benefits of the MAC design over the kernel statement registry. First, it requires no context switches when statements are generated. Context switching is only necessary when a statement is verified, which we expect to happen far less often. Second, the MAC design requires no kernel-level caching strategy. Instead, signed statements are just another element in the marshaled data being passed via IPC. The memory used for them will be reclaimed whenever the rest of the message buffer is reclaimed. Consequently, there is no risk that an older MAC statement will become unverifiable due to cache eviction.

2.4 RPC attestations

When moving from on-device IPCs to Internet RPCs, some of the properties that we rely on to secure on-device communication disappear. Most notably, the receiver of a call can no longer open a channel to talk to the authority manager, even if they did trust it¹. To combat this, QUIRE’s design requires an additional “network provider” system service, which can speak over the network, on behalf of statements made on the phone. This will require it to speak with a cryptographic secret that is not available to any applications on the system.

One method for getting such a secret key is to have the phone manufacturer embed a signed X.509 certificate, along with the corresponding private key, in trusted storage which is only accessible to the OS kernel. This certificate can be used to establish a client-authenticated TLS connection to a remote service, with the remote server using the presence of the client certificate, as endorsed by a trusted certification authority, to provide confidence that it is really communicating with the QUIRE phone’s operating system, rather than an application attempting to impersonate the OS. With this attestation-carrying encrypted channel in place, RPCs can then carry a serialized form of the same statements passed along in QUIRE IPCs, including both call chains and signed statements, with the network provider trusted to speak on behalf of the activity inside the phone.

All of this can be transmitted in a variety of ways, such as a new HTTP header. Regular QUIRE applications would be able to speak through this channel, but the new HTTP headers, with their security-relevant con-

¹Like it or not, with NATs, firewalls, and other such impediments to bi-directional connectivity, we can only reliably assume that a phone can make outbound TCP connections, not receive inbound ones.

textual information, would not be accessible to or forgeable by the applications making RPCs. (QUIRE RPCs are analogous to the HTTP origin header [2], generated by modern web browsers, but QUIRE RPCs carry the full call chain as well as any MAC statements, giving significant additional context to the RPC server.)

The strength of this security context information is limited by the ability of the device and the OS to protect the key material. If a malicious application can extract the private key, then it would be able to send messages with arbitrary claims about the provenance of the request. This leads us inevitably to techniques from the field of trusted platform measurement (TPM), where stored cryptographic key material is rendered unavailable unless the kernel was properly validated when it booted. TPM chips are common in many of today’s laptops and could well be installed in future smartphones.

Even without TPM hardware, Android phones generally prohibit applications from running with full root privileges, allowing the kernel to protect its data from malicious apps. Of course, there may well always be security vulnerabilities in trusted applications. These could be exploited by malicious apps to amplify their privileges; they’re also exploited by tools that allow users to “root” their phones, typically to work around carrier-instituted restrictions such as forbidding phones from freely relaying cellular data services as WiFi hotspots. Once a user has “rooted” an Android phone, apps can then request “super user” privileges, which if granted would allow the generation of arbitrary signed statements.

While this is far from ideal, we note that Google and other Android vendors are already strongly incentivized to fix these security holes, and that *most* users will never go to the trouble of rooting their phones. Consequently, an RPC server can treat the additional context information provided by QUIRE as a useful signal for fraud prevention, but other server-side mechanisms (e.g., anomaly detection) will remain a valuable part of any overall design.

Privacy. An interesting concern arises with our design: Every RPC call made from QUIRE uses the unique public key assigned to that phone. Presumably, the public key certificate would contain a variety of identifying information, thus making *every* RPC personally identify the owner of the phone. This may well be desirable in *some* circumstances, notably allowing web services with Android applications acting as frontends to completely eliminate any need for username/password dialogs. However, it’s clearly undesirable in other cases. To address this very issue, the Trusted Computing Group has designed what it calls “direct anonymous attesta-

tion”², using cryptographic group signatures to allow the caller to prove that it knows one of a large group of related private keys without saying anything about which one [8]. This will make it impossible to correlate multiple connections from the same phone. A production implementation of QUIRE could certainly switch from TLS client-auth to some form of anonymous attestation without a significant performance impact.

An interesting challenge, for future work, is being able to switch from anonymous attestation, in the default case, to classical client-authentication, in cases where it might be desirable. One notable challenge of this would be working around users who will click affirmatively on any “okay / cancel” dialog that’s presented to them without ever bothering to read it. Perhaps this could be finessed with an Android privilege that is requested at the time an application is installed. Unprivileged apps can only make anonymous attestations, while more trusted apps can make attestations that uniquely identify the specific user/phone.

2.5 Drawbacks and circumvention

The design of QUIRE makes no attempt to prevent a malicious deputy from circumventing the security constructs introduced in QUIRE. For example a malicious attacker could create two collaborating applications, one with internet permission and one with GPS permission, to circumvent Chinese Wall-style policies [5] that might require that the GPS provider never deliver GPS information to an app with internet permission. Such malicious interactions can be detected and averted by systems like TaintDroid [13] and XManDroid [6]. We are primarily concerned with preventing benign applications from acting as confused deputies while still enabling apps to exercise their full permission sets as intentional deputies when needed.

3 Implementation

QUIRE is implemented as a set of extensions to the existing Android Java runtime libraries and Binder IPC system. The authority manager and network provider are trusted components and therefore implemented as OS level services while our modified Android interface definition language code generator provides IPC stub code that allows applications to propagate and adopt an IPC call-stack. The result, which is implemented in around 1300 lines of Java and C++ code, is an extension to the existing Android OS that provides locally verifiable statements, IPC provenance, and authenticated RPC

for QUIRE-aware applications and backward compatibility for existing Android applications.

3.1 On- and off-phone principals

The Android architecture sandboxes applications such that apps from different sources run as different Unix users. Standard Android features also allow us to resolve user-ids into human-readable names and permission sets, based on the applications’ origins. Based on these features, the prototype QUIRE implementation defines principals as the tuple of a user-id and process-id. We include the process-id component to allow the recipient of an IPC method call to stipulate policies that force the process-id of a communication partner to remain unchanged across a series of calls. (This feature is largely ignored in the applications we have implemented for testing and evaluation purposes, but it might be useful later.)

While principals defined by user-id/process-id tuples are sufficient for the identification of an application on the phone, they are meaningless to a remote service. However, the Android system requires all applications to be signed by their developers. The public key used for signing the application can be used as part of the identity of the application. QUIRE therefore resolves the user-id/process-id tuples used in IPC call-chains into an externally meaningful string consisting of the marshaled chain of application names and public keys when RPC communication is invoked to move data off the phone. This lazy resolution of IPC principals allows QUIRE to reduce the memory footprint of statements when performing IPC calls at the cost of extra effort when RPCs are performed.

3.2 Authority management

The Authority Manager discussed in Section 2 is implemented as a system service that runs within the operating system’s reserved user-id space. The interface exposed by the service allows userspace applications to request a shared secret, submit a statement for verification, or request the resolution of the principal included in a statement into an externally meaningful form.

When an application requests a key from the authority manager, the Authority Manager maintains a table mapping user-id / process-id tuples to the key. It is important to note that a subsequent request from the same application will prompt the Authority Manager to create a new key for the calling application and replace the previous stored key in the lookup table. This prevents attacks that might try to exploit the reuse of user-ids and process-ids as applications come and go over time. Needless to say, the Authority Manager is a system service that must be trusted and separated from other apps.

²<http://www.zurich.ibm.com/security/daa/>

3.3 Verifiable statements

Section 2.3 introduced the idea of attaching an OS verifiable statement to an object in order to allow principals later in a call-chain to verify the authenticity and integrity of a received object.

Our implementation of this abstract concept involves a parcelable statement object that consists of a principal identifier as well as an authentication token. When this statement object is attached to a parcelable object, the annotated object contains all the information necessary for the Authority Manager service to validate the authentication token contained within the statement. Therefore the annotated object can be sent over Android’s IPC channels and later delivered to the QUIRE Authority Manger for verification by the OS.

QUIRE’s verifiable statement implementation establishes the authenticity of message with HMAC-SHA1, which proved to be exceptionally efficient for our needs, while still providing the authentication and integrity semantics required by QUIRE.

Even with HMAC-SHA1, speed still matters. In practice, doing HMAC-SHA1 in pure Java was still slow enough to be an issue. We resolved this by using a native C implementation from OpenSSL and exposing it to Java code as a Dalvik VM intrinsic function, rather than a JNI native method. This eliminated unnecessary copying and runs at full native speed (see Section 5.2.1).

3.4 Code generator

The key to the stack inspection semantics that QUIRE provides is an extension to the Android Interface Definition Language (AIDL) code generator. This piece of software is responsible for taking in a generalized interface definition and creating stub and proxy code to facilitate Binder IPC communication over the interface as defined in the AIDL file.

The QUIRE code generator differs from the stock Android code generator in that it adds directives to the marshaling and unmarshaling phase of the stubs that pulls the call-chain context from the calling app and attaches it to the outgoing IPC message for the callee to retrieve. These directives allow for the “quoting” semantics that form the basis of a stack inspection based policy system.

Our prototype implementation of the QUIRE AIDL code generator requires that an application developer specify that an AIDL method become “QUIRE aware” by defining the method with a reserved *auth* flag in the AIDL input file. This flag informs the QUIRE code generator to produce additional proxy and stub code for the given method that enables the propagation and delivery of the call-chain context to the specified method. A production implementation would pass this information im-

plicitly on all IPC calls.

In addition to enabling quoting semantics, the modified code generator also exposes helper functions that wrap the generation (and storage) of a shared secret with the OS Authority Manager and the creation and transmission of a verifiable statement to a communicating IPC endpoint.

4 Applications

We built two different applications to demonstrate the benefits of QUIRE’s infrastructure.

4.1 Click fraud prevention

Current Android-based advertising systems, such as AdMob, are deployed as a library that an app includes as part of its distribution. So far as the Android OS is concerned, the app and its ads are operating within single domain, indistinguishable from one another. Furthermore, because advertisement services need to report their activity to a network service, any ad-supported app must request network privileges, even if the app, by itself, doesn’t need them.

From a security perspective, mashing these two distinct security domains together into a single app creates a variety of problems. In addition to requiring network-access privileges, the lack of isolation between the advertisement code and its host creates all kinds of opportunities for fraud. The hosting app might modify the advertisement library to generate fake clicks and real revenue.

This sort of click fraud is also a serious issue on the web, and it’s typically addressed by placing the advertisements within an iframe, creating a separate protection domain and providing some mutual protection. To achieve something similar with QUIRE, we needed to extend Android’s UI layer and leverage QUIRE’s features to authenticate indirect messages, such as UI events, delegated from the parent app to the child advertisement app.

Design challenges. Fundamentally, our design requires two separate apps to be stacked (see Figure 2), with the primary application on top, and opening a transparent hole through which the subordinate advertising application can be seen by the user. This immediately raises two challenges. First, how can the advertising app know that it’s actually visible to the user, versus being obscured by the application? And second, how can the advertising app know that the clicks and other UI events it receives were legitimately generated by the user, versus being synthesized or replayed by the primary application.




Figure 2: The host and advertisement apps.

Stacking the apps. This was straightforward to implement. The hosting application implements a translucent theme (*Theme.Translucent*), making the background activity visible. When an activity containing an advertisement is started or resumed, we modified the activity launch logic system to ensure that the advertisement activity is placed below the associated host activities. When a user event is delivered to the *AppFrame* view, it sends the event along with the current location of *AppFrame* in the window to the an advertisement event service. This allows our prototype to correctly display the two apps together.

Visibility. Android allows an app to continue running, even when it's not on the screen. Assuming our ad service is built around payments per click, rather than per view, we're primarily interested in knowing, at the moment that a click occurred, that the advertisement was actually visible. Android 2.3 added a new feature where motion events contain an "obscured" flag that tells us precisely the necessary information. The only challenge is knowing that the *MotionEvent* we received was legitimate and fresh.

Verifying events. With our stacked app design, motion events are delivered to the host app, on top of the stack. The host app then recognizes when an event occurs in the advertisement's region and passes the event along. To complicate matters, Android 2.3 reengineered the event system to lower the latency, a feature desired by game designers. Events are now transmitted through shared memory buffers, below the Java layer.

In our design, we leverage QUIRE's signed statements.




Figure 3: Secure event delivery from host app to advertisement app.

We modified the event system to augment every *MotionEvent* (as many as 60 per second) with one of our MAC-based signatures. This means we don't have to worry about tampering or other corruption in the event system. Instead, once an event arrives at the advertisement app, it first validates the statement, then validates that it's not obscured, and finally validates the timestamp in the event, to make sure the click is fresh. This process is summarized in Figure 3.

At this point, the local advertising application can now be satisfied that the click was legitimate and that the ad was visible when the click occurred and it can communicate that fact over the Internet, unspoofably, with QUIRE's RPC service.

All said and done, we added around 500 lines of Java code for modifying the activity launch process, plus a modest amount of C code to generate the signatures. While our implementation does not deal with every possible scenario (e.g., changes in orientation, killing of the advertisement app due to low memory, and other such things) it still demonstrates the feasibility of hosting of advertisement in separate processes and defeating click fraud attacks.

4.2 PayBuddy

To demonstrate the usefulness of QUIRE for RPCs, we implemented a micropayment application called PayBuddy: a standalone Android application which exposes an activity to other applications on the device to allow those applications to request payments.

This is a scenario which requires a high degree of cooperation between many parties, but at the same time involves a high degree of mutual distrust. The user may not trust the application not to steal his banking infor-




Figure 4: Message flow in the PayBuddy system.

mation, while the application may not trust the user to faithfully make the required payment. Similarly, the application may not trust that the PayBuddy application on the phone is legitimate, while the PayBuddy application may not trust that the user has been accurately notified of the proper amount to be charged. Finally, the service side of PayBuddy may not trust that the legitimate PayBuddy application is the application that is submitting the payment request. We designed PayBuddy to consider all of these sources of distrust.

To demonstrate how PayBuddy works, consider the example shown in Figure 4. Application ExampleApp wishes to allow the user to make an in-app purchase. To do this, ExampleApp creates and serializes a purchase order object and signs it with its MAC key k_A . It then sends the signed object to the PayBuddy application, which can then prompt the user to confirm their intent to make the payment. After this, PayBuddy passes the purchase order along to the operating system’s Network Provider. At this point, the Network Provider can verify the signature on the purchase order, and also that the request came from the PayBuddy application. It then sends the request to the PayBuddy.com server over a client-authenticated HTTPS connection. The contents of ExampleApp’s purchase order are included in an HTTP header, as is the call chain (“ExampleApp, PayBuddy”).

At the end of this, PayBuddy.com knows the following:

- The request came from a particular device with a given certificate.
- The purchase order originated from ExampleApp

and was not tampered with by the PayBuddy application.

- The PayBuddy application approved the request (which means that the user gave their explicit consent to the purchase order).

At the end of this, if PayBuddy.com accepts the transaction, it can take whatever action accompanies the successful payment (e.g., returning a transaction ID that ExampleApp might send to its home server in order to download a new level for a game).

Security analysis. Our design has several curious properties. Most notably, the ExampleApp and the PayBuddy app are mutually distrusting of each other.

The PayBuddy app doesn’t trust the payment request to be legitimate, so it can present an “okay/cancel” dialog to the user. In that dialog, it can include the cost as well as the ExampleApp name, which it received through the QUIRE call chain. Since ExampleApp is the direct caller, its name cannot be forged. The PayBuddy app will only communicate with the PayBuddy.com server if the user approves the transaction.

Similarly, ExampleApp has only a limited amount of trust in the PayBuddy app. By signing its purchase order, and including a unique order number of some sort, a compromised PayBuddy app cannot modify or replay the message. Because the OS’s net provider is trusted to speak on behalf of both the ExampleApp and the PayBuddy app, the remote PayBuddy.com server gets ample context to understand what happened on the phone and deal with cases where a user later tries to repudiate a payment.

Lastly, the user’s PayBuddy credentials are never visible to ExampleApp in any way. Once the PayBuddy app is bound, at install time, to the user’s matching account on PayBuddy.com, there will be no subsequent username/password dialogs. All the user will see is an okay/cancel dialog. This will reduce the number of username/password dialogs that the user sees in normal usage, which will make entering username and password an exceptional situation. Once users are accustomed to this, they may be more likely to react with skepticism when presented with a phishing attack that demands their PayBuddy credentials. (A phishing attack that’s completely faithful to the proper PayBuddy user interface would only present an okay/cancel dialog, which yields no useful information for the attacker.)

Google’s in-app billing. After we implemented PayBuddy, Google released their own micropayment system. Their system leverages a private key shared between Google and each application developer to enable

the on-phone application to verify that confirmations are coming from Google’s Market servers. However, unlike PayBuddy, the messages from the Market application to the server do not contain OS-signed statements from the requesting application and the Market app. If the Market app were tampered by an attacker, this could allow for a variety of compromises that QUIRE would defeat.

Also, while Google’s in-app billing is built on Google-specific infrastructure, like its Market app, QUIRE’s design provides general-purpose infrastructure that can be used by PayBuddy or any other app.

One last difference: PayBuddy returns a transaction ID to the app which requested payment. The app must then make a new RPC to the payment server or to its own server to validate the transaction ID against the original request. Google returns a statement that is digitally signed by the Market server which can be verified by a public key that would be embedded within the app. Google’s approach avoids an additional network round trip, but they recommend code obfuscation and other measures to protect the app from external tampering³.

5 Performance evaluation

5.1 Experimental methodology

All of our experiments were performed on the standard Android developer phone, the Nexus One, which has a 1GHz ARM core (a Qualcomm QSD 8250), 512MB of RAM, and 512MB of internal Flash storage. We conducted our experiments with the phone displaying the home screen and running the normal set of applications that spawn at start up. We replaced the default “live wallpaper” with a static image to eliminate its background CPU load.

All of our benchmarks are measured using the Android Open Source Project’s (AOSP) Android 2.3 (“Gingerbread”) as pulled from the AOSP repository on December 21st, 2010. QUIRE is implemented as a series of patches to this code base. We used an unmodified Gingerbread build for “control” measurements and compared that to a build with our QUIRE features enabled for “experimental” measurements.

5.2 Microbenchmarks

5.2.1 Signed statements

Our first micro benchmark of QUIRE measures the cost of creating and verifying statements of varying sizes. To do this, we had an application generate random byte arrays




Figure 5: Statement creation and verification time vs payload size.

of varying sizes from 10 bytes to 8000 bytes and measured the time to create 1000 signatures of the data, followed by 1000 verifications of the signature. Each set of measured signatures and verifications was preceded by a priming run to remove any first-run effects. We then took an average of the middle 8 out of 10 such runs for each size. The large number of runs is due to variance introduced by garbage collection within the Authority Manager. Even with this large number of runs, we could not fully account for this, leading to some jitter in the measured performance of statement verification.

The results in Figure 5 show that statement creation carries a minimal fixed overhead of 20 microseconds with an additional cost of 15 microseconds per kilobyte. Statement verification, on the other hand, has a much higher cost: 556 microseconds fixed and an additional 96 microseconds per kilobyte. This larger cost is primarily due to the context switch and attendant copying overhead required to ask the Authority Manager to perform the verification. However, with statement verification being a much less frequent occurrence than statement generation, these performance numbers are well within our performance targets.

5.2.2 IPC call-chain tracking

Our next micro-benchmark measures the additional cost of tracking the call chain for an IPC that otherwise performs no computation. We implemented a service with a pair of methods, of which one uses the QUIRE IPC extensions and one does not. These methods both allow us to pass a byte array of arbitrary size to them. We then measured the total round trip time needed to make each of these calls. These results are intended to demonstrate the slowdown introduced by the QUIRE IPC extensions in the worst case of a round trip null operation that takes no

³http://developer.android.com/guide/market/billing/billing_best_practices.html




Figure 6: Roundtrip single step IPC time vs payload size.




Figure 7: Roundtrip IPC time vs call chain length.

action on the receiving end of the IPC method call.

We discarded performance timings for the first IPC call of each run to remove any noise that could have been caused by previous activity on the system. The results in Figure 6 were obtained by performing 10 runs of 100 trials each at each size point, with sizes ranging from 0 to 6336 bytes in 64-byte increments.

These results show that the overhead of tracking the call chain for one hop is around 70 microseconds, which is a 21% slowdown in the worst case of doing no-op calls.

We also measured the effect of adding more hops into the call chain. This was done by having a chain of identical services implementing a service similar to "trace route". The payload for each method call was a single integer, representing the number of hops remaining.

The results in Figure 7 show that the overhead of tracking the call chain is under 100 microseconds per hop, which is a 20-25% slowdown in the worst case of calls which perform no additional work. Even for a call chain of 10 applications, the overhead is just 1 millisecond,

which is a slowdown which is well below what would be noticed by a user.

5.2.3 RPC communication

Statement Depth	Time (μ s)
1	770
2	1045
4	1912
8	4576

Table 1: IPC principal to RPC principal resolution time.

The next microbenchmark we performed was determining the cost of converting from an IPC call-chain into a serialized form that is meaningful to a remote service. This includes the IPC overhead in asking the system services to perform this conversion.

We found that, even for very long statement chains (of 8 distinct applications), the extra cost of this computation is a few milliseconds, which is insignificant compared to the other costs associated with setting up and maintaining a TLS network connection. From this, we conclude that QUIRE RPCs introduce no meaningful overhead beyond the costs already present in conducting RPCs over cryptographically secure connections.

5.3 HTTPS RPC benchmark

To understand the impact of using QUIRE for calls to remote servers, we performed some simple RPCs using both QUIRE and a regular HTTPS connection. We called a simple *echo* service that returned a parameter that was provided to it. This allowed us to easily measure the effect of payload size on latency. We ran these tests on a small LAN with a single wireless router and server plugged into this router, and using the phone's WiFi antenna for connectivity. Each data point is the mean of 10 runs of 100 trials each, with the highest and lowest times thrown out prior to taking the mean to remove anomalies.

The results in Figure 8 show that QUIRE adds an additional overhead which averages around 6 ms, with a maximum of 13.5 ms, and getting smaller as the payload size increases. This extra latency is small enough that it's irrelevant in the face of the latencies experienced across typical cellular Internet connections. From this we can conclude that the overhead of QUIRE for network RPC is practically insignificant.

5.4 Analysis

Our micro-benchmarks demonstrate that adding call-chain tracking can be done without a significant perfor-




Figure 8: Network RPC latency in milliseconds.

mance penalty above and beyond that of performing standard Android IPCs. Additionally, our RPC benchmarks show that the addition of QUIRE does not cause a significant slowdown relative to standard TLS-encrypted communications as the RPC latency is dominated by the relatively slow speed of an internet connection vs. on-device communication.

These micro-benchmarks, while useful for demonstrating the small scale impact of QUIRE, do not provide valuable context as to the impact QUIRE might have on the Android user experience. However, our prototype advertisement service requires each click on the system to be annotated and signed and its performance shines a light on the full system impact of QUIRE. We tested the impact of QUIRE on touch event throughput by using the advertisement system discussed in Section 4 to sign and verify every click flowing from the OS through a host app to a simple advertisement app. We observed that the touch event throughput (which is artificially capped at 60 events per second by the Android OS) remained unchanged even when we chose to verify every touch event. This is obviously not a standard use case (as it simulates a user spamming 60 clicks per second on an advertisement), however even in this worst case scenario QUIRE does not affect the user experience of the device.

6 Related work

6.1 Smart phone platform security

As mobile phone hardware and software increase in complexity the security of the code running on a mobile devices has become a major concern.

The Kirin system [14] and Security-by-Contract [12] focus on enforcing install time application permissions within the Android OS and .NET framework respectively. These approaches to mobile phone security allow

a user to protect themselves by enforcing blanket restrictions on what applications may be installed or what installed applications may do, but do little to protect the user from applications that collaborate to leak data or protect applications from one another.

Saint [29] extends the functionality of the Kirin system to allow for runtime inspection of the full system permission state before launching a given application. Apex [28] presents another solution for the same problem where the user is responsible for defining run-time constraints on top of the existing Android permission system. Both of these approaches allow users to specify static policies to shield themselves from malicious applications, but don't allow apps to make dynamic policy decisions.

CRPE [10] presents a solution that attempts to artificially restrict an application's permissions based on environmental constraints such as location, noise, and time-of-day. While CRPE considers contextual information to apply dynamic policy decisions, it does not attempt to address privilege escalation attacks.

6.1.1 Privilege escalation

XManDroid [6] presents a solution for privilege escalation and collusion by restricting communication at runtime between applications where the communication could open a path leading to dangerous information flows based on Chinese Wall-style policies [5] (e.g., forbidding communication between an application with GPS privileges and an application with Internet access). While this does protect against some privilege escalation attacks, and allows for enforcing a more flexible range of policies, applications may launch denial of service attacks on other applications (e.g., connecting to an application and thus preventing it from using its full set of permissions) and it does not allow the flexibility for an application to regain privileges which they lost due to communicating with other applications.

In concurrent work to our own, Felt et al. present a solution to what they term "permission re-delegation" attacks against deputies on the Android system [15]. With their "IPC inspection" system, apps that receive IPC requests are poly-instantiated based on the privileges of their callers, ensuring that the callee has no greater privileges than the caller. IPC inspection addresses the same confused deputy attack as QUIRE's "security passing" IPC annotations, however the approaches differ in how intentional deputies are handled. With IPC inspection, the OS strictly ensures that callees have reduced privileges. They have no mechanism for a callee to deliberately offer a safe interface to an otherwise dangerous primitive. Unlike QUIRE, however, IPC inspection doesn't require apps to be recompiled or any other modifications to be

made to how apps make IPC requests.

6.1.2 Dynamic taint analysis on Android

The TaintDroid [13] and ParanoidAndroid [30] projects present dynamic taint analysis techniques to preventing runtime attacks and data leakage. These projects attempt to tag objects with metadata in order to track information flow and enable policies based on the path that data has taken through the system. TaintDroid’s approach to information flow control is to restrict the transmission of tainted data to a remote server by monitoring the outbound network connections made from the device and disallowing tainted data to flow along the outbound channels. The goal of QUIRE differs from that of taint analysis in that QUIRE is focused on providing provenance information and preventing the access of sensitive data, rather than in restricting where data may flow.

The low level approaches used to tag data also differ between the projects. TaintDroid enforces its taint propagation semantics by instrumenting an application’s DEX bytecode to tag every variable, pointer, and IPC message that flows through the system with a taint value. In contrast, QUIRE’s approach requires only the IPC subsystem be modified with no reliance on instrumented code, therefore QUIRE can work with applications that use native libraries and avoid the overhead imparted by instrumenting code to propagate taint values.

6.2 Decentralized information flow control

A branch of the information flow control space focuses on how to provide taint tracking in the presence of mutually distrusting applications and no centralized authority. Meyer’s and Liskov’s work on decentralized information flow control (DIFC) systems [25, 27] was the first attempt to solve this problem. Systems like DEFCon [23] and Asbestos [33] use DIFC mechanisms to dynamically apply security labels and track the taint of events moving through a distributed system. These projects and QUIRE are similar in that they both rely on process isolation and communication via message passing channels that label data. However, DEFCon cannot provide its security guarantees in the presence of deep copying of data while QUIRE can survive in an environment where deep copying is allowed since QUIRE defines policy based on the call chain and ignores the data contained within the messages forming the call chain. Asbestos avoids the deep copy problems of DEFCon by tagging data at the IPC level. While Asbestos and QUIRE use a similar approach to data tagging, the tags are used for very different purposes. Asbestos aims to prevent data leaks by enabling an application to tag its data and disallow a recipient application from leaking information that it re-

ceived over an IPC channel while QUIRE attempts to preemptively disallow data from being leaked by protecting the resource itself, rather than allowing the resource to be accessed then blocking leakage at the taint sink.

6.3 Operating system security

Communication in QUIRE is closely related to the mechanisms used in Taos [38]. Both systems intend to provide provenance to down stream callees in a communication chain, however Taos uses expensive digital signatures to secure its communication channels while QUIRE uses quoting and inexpensive MACs to accomplish the same task. This notion of substituting inexpensive cryptographic operations for expensive digital signatures was also considered as an optimization in practical Byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) [7] for situations where network latency is low and the additional message transmissions are outweighed by the cost of expensive RSA signatures.

6.4 Trusted platform management

Our use of a central authority for the authentication of statements within QUIRE shares some similarities with projects in the trusted platform management space. Terra [16] and vTPM [4] both use virtual machines as the mechanism for enabling trusted computing. The architecture of multiple segregated guest operating systems running on top of a virtual machine manager is similar to the Android design of multiple segregated users running on top of a common OS. However, these approaches both focus on establishing the user’s trust in the environment rather than trust between applications running within the system.

6.5 Web security

Many of the problems of provenance and application separation addressed in QUIRE are directly related to the challenge of enforcing the same origin policy from within the web browser. Google’s Chrome browser [3, 31] presents one solution where origin content is segregated into distinct processes. Microsoft’s Gazelle [36] project takes this idea a step further and builds up hardware-isolated protection domains in order to protect principals from one another. MashupOS [19] goes even further and builds OS level mechanisms for separating principals while still allowing for mashups.

All of these approaches are more interested in protecting principals from each other than in building up the communication mechanism between principals. QUIRE gets application separation for free by virtue of Android’s process model, and focuses on the expanding the capa-

bilities of the communication mechanism used between applications on the phone and the outside world.

6.6 Remote procedure calls

For an overview of some of the challenges and threats surrounding authenticated RPC, see Weigold et al. [37]. There are many other systems which would allow for secure remote procedure calls from mobile devices. Kerberos [22] is one solution, but it involves placing too much trust in the ticket granting server (the phone manufacturers or network providers, in our case). Another potential is OAuth [17], where services delegate rights to one another, perhaps even within the phone. This seems unlikely to work in practice, although individual QUIRE applications could have OAuth relationships with external services and could provide services internally to other applications on the phone.

7 Future work

We see QUIRE as a platform for conducting a variety of interesting security research around smartphones.

Usable and secure UI design. The IPC extensions QUIRE introduces to the Android operating system can be used as a building block in the design and implementation of a secure user interface. We have already demonstrated how the system can efficiently sign every UI event, allowing for these events to be shared and delegated safely. This existing application could be extended to attest to the full state of the screen when a security critical action, such as an OAuth accept/deny dialog, occurs and prevent UI spoofing attacks.

Secure login. Any opportunity to eliminate the need for username/password dialogs from the experience of a smartphone user would appear to be a huge win, particularly because it's much harder for phones to display traditional trusted path signals, such as modifications to the chrome of a web browser. Instead, we can leverage the low-level client-authenticated RPC channels to achieve high-level single-sign-on goals. Our PayBuddy application demonstrated the possibility of building single-sign-on systems within QUIRE. Extending this to work with multiple CAs or to integrate with OpenID / OAuth services would seem to be a fruitful avenue to pursue.

Web browsers. While QUIRE is targeted at the needs of smartphone applications, there is a clear relationship between these and the needs of web applications in modern browsers. Extensions to QUIRE could have ramifications on how code plugins (native code or otherwise) interact

with one another and with the rest of the Web. Extensions to QUIRE could also form a substrate for building a new generation of browsers with smaller trusted computing bases, where the elements that compose a web page are separated from one another. This contrasts with Chrome [31], where each web page runs as a monolithic entity. Our QUIRE work could lead to infrastructure similar, in some respects, to Gazelle [36], which separates the principals running in a given web page, but lacks our proposed provenance system or sharing mechanisms.

An interesting challenge is to harmonize the differences between web pages, which increasingly operate as applications with long-term state and the need for additional security privileges, and applications (on smartphones or on desktop computers), where the principle of least privilege [32] is seemingly violated by running every application with the full privileges of the user, whether or not this is necessary or desirable.

8 Conclusion

In this paper we presented QUIRE, a set of extensions to the Android operating system that enable applications to propagate call chain context to downstream callees and to authenticate the origin of data that they receive indirectly. These extensions allow applications to defend themselves against confused deputy attacks on their public interfaces and enable mutually untrusting apps to verify the authenticity of incoming requests with the OS. When remote communication is needed, our RPC subsystem allows the operating system to embed attestations about message origins and the IPC call chain into the request. This allows remote servers to make policy decisions based on these attestation.

We implemented the QUIRE design as a backwards-compatible extension to the Android operating system that allows existing Android applications to co-exist with applications that make use of QUIRE's services.

We evaluated our implementation of the QUIRE design by measuring our modifications to Android's Binder IPC system with a series of microbenchmarks. We also implemented two applications which use these extensions to provide click fraud prevention and in-app micropayments.

We see QUIRE as a first step towards enabling more secure mobile operating systems and applications. With the QUIRE security primitives in place we can begin building a more secure UI system and improving login on mobile devices.

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