SPORC

Group Collaboration using Untrusted Cloud Resources

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Cloud deployment: pro & con

For user-facing applications:
(e.g. word processing, calendaring, e-mail, IM)

Google docs

Google calendar

Microsoft Office Live

⋮

Cloud deployment is attractive

- Scalable, highly available, globally accessible
- Real-time collaboration

But, there's a price…

Must trust the cloud provider for confidentiality and integrity

SPORC goals

Practical cloud apps

- Flexible framework
- Real-time collaboration
- Work offline

Untrusted servers

- Can’t read user data
- Can’t tamper with user data without risking detection
- Clients can recover from tampering

Making servers untrusted

SPORC Server's limited role:

- e
- Ordering msgs



Problem #1: How do you keep clients' local copies consistent?

(esp. with offline access)



Problem #2: How do you deal with a malicious server?



Keeping clients in sync

Operational transformation (OT) [EG89]

(Used in Google Docs, EtherPad, etc.)



OT can sync arbitrarily divergent clients

Dealing with a malicious server

Digital signatures aren't enough

Server can equivocate

fork* consistency [LM07]

- Honest server: linearizability
- Malicious server: Alice and Bob detect equivocation after exchanging 2 messages
- Embed history hash in every message



Server can still fork the clients, but can't unfork

System design



System design



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

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

System design



System design



Access control

Challenges

- Server can't do it — it's untrusted!
- Preserving causality
- Concurrency makes it harder



Solutions

- Ops encrypted with symmetric key shared by clients
- ACL changes are ops too
- Concurrent ACL changes handled with barriers

Adding a user



Removing a user



Barriers: dealing with concurrency



Clients check on the server

Recovering from a fork



Can use OT to resolve malicious forks too

Implementation

Client lib + generic server

App devs only need to define ops and provide a transformation function

Java CLI version + browser-based version (GWT)

Demo apps: key value store, browser-based collaborative text editor

Evaluation

Setup

- Tested Java CLI version
- 8-core 2.3 GHz AMD machines
  - 1 for server
  - 4 for clients (often >1 instance per machine)
- Gigabit LAN

Microbenchmarks

- Latency
- Server throughput
- Time-to-join (in paper)

Latency

(Text editor app)

Low load

(1 client writer)



High load

(all clients are writers)



Server throughput



Conclusion

Practical cloud apps + untrusted servers

Operational transformation + fork* consistency

Dynamic access control and key distribution

Recovery from malicious forks

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Thank you

Questions?

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*http://www.snowpeak.com/tableware/cutlery/titanium-original-spork-sct-004.html